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Fruit of the Poison Tree: A First Amendment 
Analysis of the History and Character of 
Intelligent Design Education 
Todd R. Olin∗ 
During a press conference on August 1, 2005, a reporter 
asked President George W. Bush his opinion as to whether the 
theory of Intelligent Design should be taught alongside evolu-
tion in public schools.1 “Bush avoided a direct answer, constru-
ing the question instead as a fairness issue: ‘you’re asking me 
whether or not people ought to be exposed to different ideas, 
and the answer is yes.’”2 That simple exchange has refueled a 
national debate in the popular media, the academic world, and 
the courts over the propriety of teaching evolution and other 
theories of human origin in public schools.3 But the question 
remains: does teaching the theory of Intelligent Design in pub-
lic school science classrooms violate the separation of church 
 
∗  J.D. Candidate 2007, University of Minnesota Law School; B.S. 2002, 
University of Minnesota. I dedicate this Note to my parents and grandparents 
for making possible my life and all its opportunities. I am also deeply indebted 
to Professor Dale Carpenter for his guidance and direction throughout the 
writing of this piece. Finally, special thanks to Emily for all her love and sup-
port. 
 1. See Nat’l Ctr. for Sci. Educ., More on President Bush’s Remarks on 
“Intelligent Design” (Aug. 8, 2005), http://www.ncseweb.org/resources/news/ 
2005/US/926_more_on_bush39s_remarks_on__8_8_2005.asp. 
 2. Id. 
 3. See, e.g., Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707 
(M.D. Pa. 2005); John Angus Campbell & Stephen C. Meyer, Op-Ed., How 
Should Schools Handle Evolution?: Debate It, USA TODAY, Aug. 15, 2005, at 
13A, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/2005-08-
14-evolution-debate_x.htm; Eugenie C. Scott & Glenn Branch, Op-Ed., How 
Should Schools Handle Evolution?: Just Teach It, USA TODAY, Aug. 15, 2005, 
at 13A, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/2005-08-
14-evolution-teach_x.htm; Press Release, Am. Soc’y of Agronomy, Crop Sci. 
Soc’y of Am. & Soil Sci. Soc’y of Am., Scientific Societies Support Teaching 
Evolution (Aug. 15, 2005), http://www.asa-cssa-sssa.org/pdf/intdesign_050815 
.pdf; Nat’l Ctr. for Sci. Educ., supra note 1. 
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and state embodied in the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment? 
This Note argues that it does. Intelligent Design is not the 
first challenger to evolution. It is, rather, the latest in a long 
line of inherently religious theories the teaching of which has 
consistently been struck down by the federal courts. Independ-
ent of this historical pedigree, Intelligent Design postulates the 
inherently religious idea that an extraterrestrial or supernatu-
ral intelligence created life. Under established case law, teach-
ing the truth of a theory characterized by these two attributes 
is constitutionally impermissible. 
Part I of this Note describes the historical development of 
the evolution-creationism debate and the applicable case law. 
Part II analyzes the teaching of Intelligent Design in public 
school science classes under both the test that the Supreme 
Court uses to evaluate controversies involving human origin 
education and another test often applied by some lower courts 
and commentators. Part II also discusses and rejects two oft-
propounded justifications for teaching Intelligent Design. Fi-
nally, Part II concludes that due to the character and historical 
pedigree of Intelligent Design, an Establishment Clause viola-
tion occurs whenever this theory is taught in public school sci-
ence classes. Part III offers ways for public schools to provide a 
complete human origin education while avoiding constitutional 
problems. 
I.  HUMAN ORIGIN LITIGATION UNDER  
THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
Intelligent Design posits that an intelligent agent designed 
life on earth. Teaching this theory in public schools therefore 
implicates the separation of church and state embodied in the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 
A. THE SUPREME COURT’S ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
JURISPRUDENCE 
As one commentator aptly noted, “[T]he Supreme Court’s 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence [is] both confusing and 
unpredictable.”4 The First Amendment states that “Congress 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
 
 4. Jay D. Wexler, Note, Of Pandas, People, and the First Amendment: 
The Constitutionality of Teaching Intelligent Design in the Public Schools, 49 
STAN. L. REV. 439, 455 (1997). 
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prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”5 It is well accepted that 
the Establishment Clause applies to state governments as in-
corporated through the Fourteenth Amendment.6 But the Su-
preme Court has recognized that “States and local school 
boards are generally afforded considerable discretion in operat-
ing public schools.”7 The Court has further stated that 
“[j]udicial interposition in the operation of the public school 
system . . . raises problems requiring care and restraint.”8 
When decisions of states and school boards demonstrably run 
afoul of the First Amendment, however, the Court has been 
willing to intercede. It has found Establishment Clause viola-
tions where public schools have facilitated praying,9 Bible read-
ing,10 observing moments of silence for purposes of prayer,11 
and displaying copies of the Ten Commandments.12 
The Court has developed several tests to evaluate conduct 
under the Establishment Clause. The test developed in Lemon 
v. Kurtzman13 was once considered the “Grand Unified Theory” 
of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, but its status has since 
declined.14 Although the Lemon test remains the only one the 
Court has applied to controversies involving the teaching of 
 
 5. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 6. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). 
 7. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583 (1987). 
 8. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968). 
 9. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 298, 315–17 
(2000) (finding that a policy permitting student-initiated and student-led 
prayer at football games violated the Establishment Clause); Lee v. Weisman, 
505 U.S. 577, 581–82, 598–99 (1992) (finding that a nonsectarian prayer deliv-
ered by a clergyman during a public middle school graduation ceremony was 
an Establishment Clause violation). 
 10. See, e.g., Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 205 (1963) 
(finding a requirement of daily Bible reading in public schools to be an Estab-
lishment Clause violation). 
 11. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 40–41, 59–61 (1985) (finding 
a state statute mandating a moment of silence for “‘meditation or voluntary 
prayer’” to be an Establishment Clause violation (quoting ALA. CODE § 16-1-
20.1 (Supp. 1984))). 
 12. See, e.g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 39–40, 42–43 (1980) (finding a 
statute that required the posting of the Ten Commandments in all public 
school classrooms in the state to be an Establishment Clause violation). 
 13. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
 14. See Wexler, supra note 4, at 455; see also, e.g., Tangipahoa Parish Bd. 
of Educ. v. Freiler, 530 U.S. 1251, 1253 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (reiterat-
ing his disapproval of the Lemon test), denying cert. to 185 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 
1999). 
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theories of human origin,15 the endorsement test16 is a substi-
tute widely supported among commentators and recently ap-
plied in this context by a district court in the Third Circuit.17 
Under the three-pronged Lemon test, “a government-
sponsored message violates the Establishment Clause of the 
First Amendment if: (1) it does not have a secular purpose; (2) 
its principal or primary effect advances or inhibits religion; or 
(3) it creates an excessive entanglement of the government with 
religion.”18 If any of these prongs are breached, there is an Es-
tablishment Clause violation.19 
Since Lemon, however, this simple three-pronged test has 
evolved. Courts have recognized that “the second and third 
prongs of the Lemon test are interrelated insofar as courts of-
ten consider similar factors in analyzing them.”20 Many circuits 
have combined the last two prongs “into a single ‘effect’ in-
quiry.”21 In addition, the Court “has emphasized that there is 
no bright-line rule for evaluating Establishment Clause chal-
lenges and that each challenge calls for line-drawing based on a 
fact-specific, case-by-case analysis.”22 
 
 
 15. For one example of a circuit court applying the Lemon test in the con-
text of teaching theories of human origin, see Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish 
Board of Education, 185 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 16. A majority of the Court adopted and applied the endorsement test in 
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592–94 (1989). See also Modrovich 
v. Allegheny County, 385 F.3d 397, 399, 406–13 (3d Cir. 2004) (applying the 
endorsement test to determine the legality of displaying the Ten Command-
ments on a courthouse); Deborah A. Reule, Note, The New Face of Creation-
ism: The Establishment Clause and the Latest Efforts to Suppress Evolution in 
Public Schools, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2555, 2567 (2001) (describing the endorse-
ment test). 
 17. See Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 712 
(M.D. Pa. 2005) (“[B]oth the endorsement test and the Lemon test should be 
employed . . . to analyze the constitutionality of [teaching Intelligent Design] 
under the Establishment Clause . . . .”). 
 18. Id. at 746 (citing Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13). 
 19. Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1295 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 20. Selman v. Cobb County Sch. Dist., 390 F. Supp. 2d 1286, 1299 (N.D. 
Ga. 2005) (citing Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232–33 (1997); Holloman ex 
rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1284–85 (11th Cir. 2004)). 
 21. Id. (citing Child Evangelism Fellowship of N.J. Inc. v. Stafford Twp. 
Sch. Dist., 386 F.3d 514, 534 (3d Cir. 2004); Holloman, 370 F.3d at 1285; 
Commack Self-Serv. Kosher Meats, Inc. v. Weiss, 294 F.3d 415, 424 (2d Cir. 
2002); Columbia Union Coll. v. Clarke, 159 F.3d 151, 157 (4th Cir. 1998)). 
 22. King v. Richmond County, 331 F.3d 1271, 1275–76 (11th Cir. 2003) 
(citing County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592 (1989); Lynch v. Don-
nelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984)). 
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Under the purpose prong of the Lemon test, a court will 
ask “whether government’s actual purpose is to endorse or dis-
approve of religion.”23 Although the Court has said that gov-
ernmental action will violate the purpose prong only if it is “en-
tirely motivated by a purpose to advance religion,”24 it has also 
held, more specifically, that a “religious purpose must not be 
preeminent.”25 In general, an examining court “should defer to 
a state’s articulation of a secular purpose, so long as the state-
ment is sincere and not a sham.”26 The factual context and con-
temporaneous legislative history elucidate this inquiry.27 
The effects prong of the Lemon test “asks whether the 
[governmental action] at issue in fact conveys a message of en-
dorsement or disapproval of religion to an informed, reasonable 
observer.”28 Courts have described this “informed, reasonable 
observer” as “someone who personifies the ‘community ideal of 
reasonable behavior’ and is familiar with the origins and con-
text of the government-sponsored message at issue and the his-
tory of the community where the message is displayed.”29 This 
determination is not made solely on the basis of factual find-
ings, but is rather primarily a legal question based largely on 
judicial interpretation of social context.30 
As an alternative to the Lemon test in the context of Estab-
lishment Clause violations, some lower courts and commenta-
tors have employed the endorsement test. A district court in 
the Third Circuit recently applied this test to evaluate the con-
stitutionality of teaching Intelligent Design in public schools.31 
 
 23. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 24. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985). 
 25. Selman, 390 F. Supp. 2d at 1300 (citing Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 
41 (1980)). 
 26. Id. (citing Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 586–87 (1987)). 
 27. Id. (citing Edwards, 482 U.S. at 594). 
 28. Id. at 1305 (citing Wallace, 472 U.S. at 56 n.42; Glassroth v. Moore, 
335 F.3d 1282, 1297 (11th Cir. 2003); Bown v. Gwinnett County Sch. Dist., 112 
F.3d 1464, 1472 (11th Cir. 1997)). 
 29. Id. at 1306 (citing Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 
515 U.S. 753, 779–81 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring 
in the judgment); Turner v. Habersham County, 290 F. Supp. 2d 1362, 1372 
(N.D. Ga. 2003)). 
 30. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 693–94 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concur-
ring). 
 31. See Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 712 
(M.D. Pa. 2005) (“[B]oth the endorsement test and the Lemon test should be 
employed . . . to analyze the constitutionality of [teaching Intelligent Design] 
under the Establishment Clause . . . .”). 
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 Justice O’Connor first proposed the endorsement test in 
her concurrence in Lynch v. Donnelly,32 and a majority of the 
Court later adopted it in County of Allegheny v. ACLU.33 The 
test “determine[s] whether a statute or action promotes or sup-
ports one religious ideology over any other” by “examin[ing] 
whether state action endorses a particular religion or religious 
belief.”34 Under this test, a court assesses the message a par-
ticular practice conveys in light of its proponents’ subjective in-
tent and observers’ objective perceptions.35 The practice vio-
lates the Establishment Clause if it “sends a message to 
nonadherents that they are outsiders . . . and an accompanying 
message to adherents that they are insiders.”36 When evaluat-
ing the perceptions of objective observers, a court must consider 
the “context in which the contested object appears.”37 Justice 
O’Connor elaborated that “the ‘history and ubiquity’ of a prac-
tice is relevant because it provides part of the context in which 
a reasonable observer evaluates whether a challenged govern-
mental practice conveys a message of endorsement of relig-
ion.”38 
B. HUMAN ORIGIN EDUCATION JURISPRUDENCE 
Courts have heard cases involving issues of human origin 
education since the 1920s. The types of legal challenges have 
changed along with public and scientific understandings of the 
different theories involved, but the basic controversy has in-
variably focused on the question of whether to teach evolution 
or creationism. 
Charles Darwin sparked the evolution-creationism contro-
versy in 1859 with the publication of The Origin of Species,39 
which introduced the world to the concept of evolution. Derek 
Davis noted that the “theory of organic evolution was the first 
 
 32. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687–94 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 33. See 492 U.S. 573, 592–94 (1989). 
 34. Reule, supra note 16, at 2567 (summarizing the test set forth in Jus-
tice O’Connor’s concurrence in Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687–94). 
 35. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 36. Id. at 688. 
 37. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 595. 
 38. Id. at 630 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
 39. CHARLES DARWIN, THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES (Gillian Beer ed., Oxford 
Univ. Press 1996) (1859). 
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serious challenge to traditional beliefs in divine creation,”40 and 
contemporary scientists struggled to reconcile it with then-
widely accepted biblical truths.41 As Davis explained, Darwin-
ism “shattered” the notion that species had unchanging charac-
teristics, “and with it the view that humans are a distinct spe-
cies, a special creation of God.”42 
Although most of the scientific community quickly accepted 
Darwin’s theory unmodified, other segments of society at-
tempted to reconcile it with their religious beliefs.43 Many “in-
sisted that evolutionary development was compatible with pur-
poseful design.”44 By the beginning of the twentieth century, 
however, science had advanced, and the evidence of evolution 
became overwhelming. Consequently, these combination evolu-
tion-creationism theories became “increasingly untenable.”45 
The science classrooms of public secondary schools soon re-
flected these changes. According to Davis, “Within twenty years 
after the publication of Origin of Species, the sophisticated way 
to teach science was to teach evolutionary theory.”46 As evolu-
tion became the educational norm, its opponents came to view 
the theory as an attack on religion itself.47 The conflict pushed 
each side of the debate to adopt the extreme of its position.48 
“The proponents of creationism declared war on the evolution-
ists, a war whose biggest battlefield would become the nation’s 
public schools.”49 
William Jennings Bryan led the creationist side of the bat-
tle.50 Bryan’s campaign against evolution resulted in, among 
other things, a Tennessee law banning the teaching of evolu-
tion in public schools.51 It was the violation of this law for 
 
 40. Derek H. Davis, Kansas Versus Darwin: Examining the History and 
Future of the Creationism-Evolution Controversy in American Public Schools, 
9 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 205, 210 (1999). 
 41. See id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. See id. at 210–11. 
 44. Id. at 210. 
 45. See id. at 211 (explaining the simultaneous explosion of evidence for 
evolution and the secularization of science as a discipline). 
 46. Id. 
 47. See id. 
 48. See id. 
 49. Id. at 212. 
 50. See Wexler, supra note 4, at 445. 
 51. Id. at 446. 
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which John Scopes was arrested and tried in 1925.52 Bryan 
prosecuted the case on behalf of the State of Tennessee.53 
Scopes allowed Clarence Darrow and the ACLU to represent 
him in arguing that the Tennessee law was unconstitutional.54 
The Scopes Trial55 was the first notable legal challenge to 
the teaching of evolution and one of the most famous trials of 
the early twentieth century.56 The failure of Darrow’s legal 
team to procure a declaration that the Tennessee ban on the 
teaching of evolution was unconstitutional57 encouraged several 
other states to enact similar bans.58 Mississippi and Arkansas 
in 1926 and 1928, respectively, passed laws prohibiting the 
teaching of evolution in public schools.59 It was not until 1968, 
however, that the Supreme Court considered the validity of one 
of these laws.60 
In Epperson v. Arkansas, the Court found that an Arkan-
sas statute forbidding the teaching of evolution in public 
schools violated the Establishment Clause.61 The law in ques-
tion made it illegal to teach evolution or use any text that dis-
cussed evolution in any institution receiving public funds.62 Al-
though the state court expressed no view as to whether the 
statutory prohibition extended beyond teaching the truth of 
evolution to also banning the mere objective explanation of the 
theory’s contents, the Court held that the distinction was ir-
relevant.63 Although the Arkansas law did not explicitly state 
that its purpose was to exclude any nonbiblical theories of ori-
 
 52. Id. 
 53. See id. 
 54. See id. 
 55. For an account of the trial, see, for example, BRYAN AND DARROW AT 
DAYTON: THE RECORD AND DOCUMENTS OF THE “BIBLE-EVOLUTION TRIAL” 
(Leslie H. Allen ed., Russell & Russell 1967) (1925). Scopes’s conviction was 
ultimately reversed on the grounds that his fine was not assessed by a jury. 
Scopes v. State, 289 S.W. 363, 367 (Tenn. 1927). 
 56. See Wexler, supra note 4, at 446. 
 57. See Scopes, 289 S.W. at 366–67 (finding no basis under the state con-
stitution for invalidating the prohibition on teaching evolution on the grounds 
of religious establishment); see also Wexler, supra note 4, at 447 n.70 (“The 
court did not discuss whether the law was consistent with the U.S. Constitu-
tion.”). 
 58. See Davis, supra note 40, at 212. 
 59. See id. 
 60. See id. The case was Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968). 
 61. Epperson, 393 U.S. at 98, 103, 109. 
 62. Id. at 98–99. 
 63. Id. at 102–03. 
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gin,64 Justice Fortas explained that “[i]t is clear that fundamen-
talist sectarian conviction was and is the law’s reason for exis-
tence”65 as it “selects from the body of knowledge a particular 
segment which it proscribes for the sole reason that it is 
deemed to conflict with a particular religious doctrine.”66 
The Epperson Court asserted that “[t]he First Amendment 
mandates governmental neutrality between religion and relig-
ion, and between religion and nonreligion.”67 The prohibition is 
absolute and bars laws that prefer either religion or nonre-
ligion.68 The Court also observed that “‘the state has no legiti-
mate interest in protecting any or all religions from views dis-
tasteful to them,’”69 but was careful to note that “study of 
religions and of the Bible from a literary and historic viewpoint, 
presented objectively as part of a secular program of education, 
need not collide with the First Amendment’s prohibition.”70 
After Epperson blocked the movement to ban the teaching 
of evolution, advocates of creationism offered a new alternative. 
Relying heavily on another Supreme Court decision that pro-
tected atheist students from mandatory public school prayer,71 
two parents convinced the California Board of Education that 
they were entitled to protect their children from a scientific 
theory that offended their religion.72 This creationist victory led 
to the “balanced treatment” approach whereby schools taught 
evolution and creationism in equal proportion.73 The balanced 
treatment approach also required schools to teach a new “‘sci-
entific creationism’” that explored “‘only the scientific aspects of 
creationism.’”74 This strategy was popular, and school boards 
across the country, as well as the Arkansas and Louisiana leg-
islatures, soon required secondary schools to give balanced 
treatment to evolution and creationism.75 
 
 64. See id. at 109. 
 65. Id. at 107–08. 
 66. Id. at 103. 
 67. Id. at 104. 
 68. See id. at 106–07. 
 69. Id. at 107 (quoting Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 505 
(1952)). 
 70. Id. at 106. 
 71. Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 205, 211–12 (1963), 
rev’g Murray v. Curlett, 179 A.2d 698 (Md. 1962). 
 72. See Davis, supra note 40, at 213. 
 73. See id. at 213–14. 
 74. See id. 
 75. See id. 
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Litigants immediately challenged the Arkansas statute, 
and a federal district court found that it violated the Estab-
lishment Clause.76 The court held that the law failed all three 
prongs of the Lemon test.77  
The Supreme Court considered the equivalent Louisiana 
law in Edwards v. Aguillard.78 Applying the Lemon test,79 the 
Court held that Louisiana’s balanced treatment statute (the 
Act) violated the Establishment Clause.80 Although the Act 
purported “to protect academic freedom,” the Court found that 
the state had not in fact designed it to further that goal.81 Since 
teachers already had the freedom to present alternative theo-
ries of human origin, the law did not grant them anything they 
did not already have.82 Justice Brennan expounded: 
Even if “academic freedom” is read to mean “teaching all of the evi-
dence” with respect to the origin of human beings, the Act does not 
further this purpose. The goal of providing a more comprehensive sci-
ence curriculum is not furthered either by outlawing the teaching of 
evolution or by requiring the teaching of creation science.83 
Moreover, in light of the legislative history, Justice Brennan 
found a primarily religious purpose behind the law.84 Acknowl-
edging the “historic and contemporaneous link between the 
teachings of certain religious denominations and the teaching 
of evolution,” he observed that the Court “need not be blind . . . 
to the legislature’s preeminent religious purpose in enacting 
this statute.”85 The Court also cited Stone v. Graham for the 
proposition that actual legislative purpose can be derived with-
out reference to the legislative history.86 The Edwards Court 
ultimately concluded that “[b]ecause the primary purpose of 
the . . . Act is to advance a particular religious belief, the Act 
 
 76. See id. at 214, 223 n.58 (discussing McLean v. Ark. Bd. of Educ., 529 
F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982)). 
 77. McLean, 529 F. Supp. at 1272. 
 78. 482 U.S. 578 (1987); Davis, supra note 40, at 214. 
 79. See Edwards, 482 U.S. at 582–85. 
 80. See id. at 581, 596–97. 
 81. See id. at 586–89. 
 82. Id. at 587. 
 83. Id. at 586. 
 84. Id. at 591–94. 
 85. Id. at 590. 
 86. See id. at 589 (noting the Court’s prior observation that “‘[t]he Ten 
Commandments are undeniably a sacred text in the Jewish and Christian 
faiths, and no legislative recitation of a supposed secular purpose can blind us 
to that fact’” (quoting Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980) (footnote omit-
ted))). 
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endorses religion in violation of the First Amendment.”87 
 Finding that the Act violated the first prong of the Lemon 
test, it was unnecessary for the Court to consider the second or 
third prongs.88 The Court was careful, however, to preserve the 
right of schools to present scientific critiques of scientific theo-
ries.89 It carefully limited its holding, stating that “teaching a 
variety of scientific theories about the origins of humankind to 
schoolchildren might be validly done with the clear secular in-
tent of enhancing the effectiveness of science instruction.”90 
C. THE RECENT EMERGENCE OF NEW ANTIEVOLUTION 
MOVEMENTS 
With Edwards, the attempt to dictate the content of hu-
man origin education ended and the heated evolution-
creationism debate of the mid-1980s subsided.91 In the last 
decade, however, creationists have developed new alternatives, 
and the public debate has reemerged.92 As one commentator 
explained, “[C]reationists continue to use the specific language 
of the [Supreme] Court’s opinions to attempt to create constitu-
tional ways to achieve their goals.”93 Recognizing the narrow 
language of the Court’s decisions, creationists have focused on 
influencing the decisions left to state and local control.94 
1. Efforts to Attach Disclaimers to Evolution Materials 
One tactic employed by creationists is to discount the valid-
ity of evolution by using disclaimers.95 State legislatures and 
boards of education have drafted statements that are either 
printed and attached to biology textbooks, or read aloud in sci-
 
 87. Id. at 593. 
 88. See id. at 585, 597. 
 89. See id. at 593–94. 
 90. Id. at 594. 
 91. See Wexler, supra note 4, at 451. 
 92. See id. at 451–52. Since 1991, a plethora of newspaper and journal ar-
ticles, books, and websites have critiqued evolution. A few of the most notable 
books include MICHAEL J. BEHE, DARWIN’S BLACK BOX: THE BIOCHEMICAL 
CHALLENGE TO EVOLUTION (1996); PERCIVAL DAVIS & DEAN H. KENYON, OF 
PANDAS AND PEOPLE: THE CENTRAL QUESTION OF BIOLOGICAL ORIGINS 
(Charles B. Thaxton ed., 2d ed. 1993); PHILLIP E. JOHNSON, DARWIN ON TRIAL 
(2d ed. 1993); and JONATHAN WELLS, ICONS OF EVOLUTION: SCIENCE OR 
MYTH? (2000). 
 93. Reule, supra note 16, at 2580. 
 94. See id. at 2581. 
 95. Id. at 2585. 
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ence classes.96 These statements vary somewhat in content, but 
commonly purport to “warn” students that evolution is a the-
ory, not a fact, and that scientific disagreement exists over the 
validity of evolution.97 
The plaintiffs in Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Board of 
Education98 challenged such an oral disclaimer. The local 
school board had “adopted a resolution disclaiming the en-
dorsement of evolution” and forced all teachers in the parish to 
read it in class before presenting any material on evolution.99 
The disclaimer explicitly stated that evolution instruction was 
“‘not intended to influence or dissuade the Biblical version of 
Creation or any other concept.’”100 The Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that the disclaimer violated the Establishment 
Clause because it failed both the endorsement test and the ef-
fects prong of the Lemon test.101 The court found that “the dis-
claimer as a whole furthers a . . . [nonsecular] purpose, namely 
the protection and maintenance of a particular religious view-
point.”102 
More recently, the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Georgia confronted the same issue. In 
Selman v. Cobb County School District,103 the school district 
had removed all material related to theories of human origin 
from the curricula of primary-grade classes and from classes 
required for high school graduation.104 It had also notified stu-
dents and parents of classes that contained information on the 
subject.105 Later, when district science teachers recommended 
new science textbooks to the school board, the board approved 
the texts only on the condition that a written disclaimer be at-
tached to their covers.106 The disclaimer made no reference to 
religion; it simply stated that “[e]volution is a theory, not a 
 
 96. Id. 
 97. See id. at 2585–86. 
 98. 185 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 99. See id. at 341. 
 100. Id. (quoting a school board resolution containing the disclaimer). 
 101. See id. at 348. 
 102. Id. at 344–45. The disclaimer ultimately passed the purpose prong of 
the Lemon test because it furthered two sincere and permissible secular objec-
tives. Id. at 345–46. 
 103. 390 F. Supp. 2d 1286 (N.D. Ga. 2005). 
 104. See id. at 1290. 
 105. See id. 
 106. See id. at 1292. 
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fact.”107 Parents opposed to the disclaimer brought suit to chal-
lenge it.108 
Without an official statement of purpose or any legislative 
history to analyze,109 the court relied on noncontemporaneous 
statements of board members and other circumstantial evi-
dence.110 The court accepted “[f]ostering critical thinking” as a 
genuine, secular purpose for the disclaimer.111 The court dis-
tinguished Freiler on the basis that the disclaimer in that case 
specifically referred to biblical creationism as a valid theory,112 
and that its purpose was not the promotion of critical thinking, 
but rather “‘the protection and maintenance of a particular re-
ligious viewpoint.’”113 The Selman court emphasized the fact 
that the disclaimer “does not contain a reference to religion in 
general, any particular religion, or any religious theory.”114 
Moreover, because evolution was the only theory of origin 
taught in the district, the court did not think asking students to 
critically analyze it was a sham.115 
After having recognized a sincere secular purpose for the 
disclaimer, however, the court found that this was not the dis-
trict’s primary purpose.116 Rather, “[T]he chief purpose of the 
[disclaimer] is to accommodate or reduce offense to those per-
sons who hold beliefs that might be deemed inconsistent with 
the scientific theory of evolution.”117 Because this purpose was 
“intertwined with religion,” the court continued the analysis 
under Lemon’s purpose prong.118 Quoting Epperson, the court 
recognized that the First Amendment does not allow states to 
require the tailoring of education to principles of any particular 
 
 107. See id. (quoting the disclaimer). The disclaimer simply stated: “This 
textbook contains material on evolution. Evolution is a theory, not a fact, re-
garding the origin of living things. This material should be approached with 
an open mind, studied carefully, and critically considered.” Id. 
 108. Id. at 1288. 
 109. See id. at 1301. 
 110. See id. at 1301–02. 
 111. Id. at 1302. 
 112. See id. (discussing Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ., 185 F.3d 
337 (5th Cir. 1999)). 
 113. Id. (quoting Freiler, 185 F.3d at 344–45). 
 114. Id. 
 115. See id. at 1302–03. 
 116. Id. at 1303. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
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religion.119 But it also held that under Freiler, “‘local school 
boards need not turn a blind eye to the concerns of students 
and parents troubled by the teaching of evolution in public 
classrooms.’”120 The court therefore struck a balance, stating 
that “[t]he School Board’s decision to adopt the [disclaimer] was 
undisputably [sic] influenced by sectarian interests, but the 
Constitution forbids only a purpose to endorse or advance relig-
ion.”121 Not willing to infer such a purpose without any direct 
evidence, the court found that accommodation of parents was a 
permissible secular purpose.122 The disclaimer, therefore, 
passed the purpose prong of the Lemon test.123 
The constitutional fault of the disclaimer, however, arose 
under the effects prong of the Lemon test. The court held that 
the disclaimer violated this prong124 because “an informed, rea-
sonable observer would interpret the [disclaimer] to convey a 
message of endorsement of religion.”125 It also held that the dis-
claimer violated the endorsement test126 because it “sends a 
message to those who oppose evolution for religious reasons 
that they are favored members of the political community, 
while [also sending] a message to those who believe in evolu-
tion that they are political outsiders.”127 Additionally, the court 
found that the disclaimer had the dual effects of “implicitly bol-
stering alternative religious theories of origin by suggesting 
that evolution is a problematic theory”128 and “undermining 
evolution education to the benefit of those . . . citizens who 
would prefer that students maintain their religious beliefs re-
garding the origin of life.”129 The court pointed to these effects 
as further support of the disclaimer’s constitutional failure un-
der the effects prong of the Lemon test and also under the en-
dorsement test. In justifying its conclusions, the court drew 
heavily on history and the common-sense conclusions that an 
 
 119. Id. (citing Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106 (1968)). 
 120. Id. at 1304 (quoting Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ., 185 
F.3d 337, 346 (5th Cir. 1999)). 
 121. Id. 
 122. See id. at 1304–05. 
 123. Id. at 1305. 
 124. Id. at 1312. 
 125. Id. at 1306. 
 126. Id. at 1312. 
 127. Id. at 1306. 
 128. Id. at 1308. 
 129. Id. at 1310. 
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“informed, reasonable observer” would have reached under the 
circumstances.130 
The critical fault of the disclaimer was its statement that 
“‘[e]volution is a theory, not a fact, concerning the origin of liv-
ing things.’”131 According to the court, the problem was not the 
statement’s veracity, but rather that it did not acknowledge the 
ocean of public debate surrounding the issue.132 Considering 
the debate’s wider social history and its impact on public edu-
cation, the court felt that the language clearly revealed the 
board’s true stance on the issue: it sided with creationists.133 
The court stated that the question of whether evolution is a 
theory or a fact “is certainly a loaded issue with religious un-
dertones.”134 In so holding, the court evidenced a judicial will-
ingness to examine social facts and secondary sources to ana-
lyze the effects of a disclaimer.135 That the board did not have a 
religious purpose in adopting the disclaimer had no bearing 
under the effects prong of the Lemon test.136 
2. Efforts to Introduce the Theory of Intelligent Design 
Several states have enacted laws requiring that public 
schools present evolution as theory, not fact.137 This has opened 
the door to the Intelligent Design movement.138 Proponents of 
Intelligent Design urge teachers to concentrate on the short-
comings of evolution and question its conclusions.139 The 
movement’s mantra is “teach the controversy.”140 Although In-
telligent Design claims that many features of biological life are 
so complex that they must have originated under the auspices 
of an intelligent designer, the theory does not in any way refer-
ence religion or allude to the identity or characteristics of the 
 
 130. See id. at 1306–07. 
 131. Id. at 1307 (alteration in original) (quoting the disclaimer). 
 132. See id. 
 133. See id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. See id. at 1308. 
 136. See id. 
 137. Reule, supra note 16, at 2586 (naming North Carolina and Ohio as ex-
amples). 
 138. See id. at 2586–87. 
 139. Id. at 2587. 
 140. See id. (citing DAVID K. DEWOLF ET AL., INTELLIGENT DESIGN IN PUB-
LIC SCHOOL SCIENCE CURRICULA: A LEGAL GUIDEBOOK 23 (1999)). 
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designer.141 The theory simply maintains that “intelligent 
agency . . . has more explanatory power in accounting for . . . 
biological entities . . . than [evolution].”142 
In the fall of 2004, the school board of Dover, Pennsyl-
vania, “instructed its ninth-grade biology teachers to tell stu-
dents the theory of evolution is an incomplete one, and that in-
telligent design . . . is an alternative argument to evolution.”143 
Although evolution remained a part of the district’s curricula 
and standardized tests, parents in the district quickly brought 
suit in federal district court to challenge the disclaimer.144 The 
resulting case, Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District,145 was 
the first constitutional test of Intelligent Design.146 
The district court in Kitzmiller applied both the Lemon test 
and the endorsement test in evaluating the constitutionality of 
the disclaimer.147 Before considering the perceptions of both 
student and adult objective observers,148 the court examined 
 
 141. See id. 
 142. Francis J. Beckwith, Public Education, Religious Establishment, and 
the Challenge of Intelligent Design, 17 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 
461, 462 (2003). 
 143. Bill Toland, Getting Their Day in Court: ‘Intelligent Design’ Supporters 
State Case, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Sept. 25, 2005, at A1. The full dis-
claimer reads: 
  The Pennsylvania Academic Standards require students to learn 
about Darwin’s Theory of Evolution and eventually to take a stan-
dardized test of which evolution is a part. 
  Because Darwin’s Theory is a theory, it continues to be tested as 
new evidence is discovered. The Theory is not a fact. Gaps in the The-
ory exist for which there is no evidence. A theory is defined as a well-
tested explanation that unifies a broad range of observations. 
  Intelligent Design is an explanation of the origin of life that dif-
fers from Darwin’s view. The reference book, Of Pandas and People, is 
available for students who might be interested in gaining an under-
standing of what Intelligent Design actually involves. 
  With respect to any theory, students are encouraged to keep an 
open mind. The school leaves the discussion of the Origins of Life to 
individual students and their families. As a Standards-driven district, 
class instruction focuses upon preparing students to achieve profi-
ciency on Standards-based assessments. 
Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 708–09 (M.D. Pa 
2005). 
 144. See Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 708–10. 
 145. 400 F. Supp. 2d 707. 
 146. See Toland, supra note 143. 
 147. Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 714–46 (applying the endorsement test); 
id. at 746–64 (applying the Lemon test). 
 148. Id. at 723–29 (discussing the perceptions of an objective student); id. 
at 729–35 (discussing the perceptions of an objective adult). 
OLIN_3FMT 04/24/2006 10:41:43 AM 
2006] FRUIT OF THE POISON TREE 1123 
 
the history of the Intelligent Design movement.149 The court 
emphatically found that Intelligent Design is a new form of 
creationism150 and that the designer it proposes is the God of 
Christianity.151 It then derided the disclaimer for singling out 
evolution as a problematic theory and undermining it in fur-
therance of the school board’s favored religious alternative.152 
Finding that the religious nature of Intelligent Design is evi-
dent both “because [Intelligent Design] involves a supernatural 
designer”153 and because of the theory’s “‘history and con-
text,’”154 the court held that “the religious nature of [Intelligent 
Design] would be readily apparent to an objective observer, 
adult or child.”155 It therefore found violations of the endorse-
ment test156 and both the purpose and effects prongs of the 
Lemon test.157 
The Kitzmiller court also held that Intelligent Design is not 
science.158 The scientific observations to which its proponents 
point for support are not positive arguments for Intelligent De-
sign, but rather negative arguments against evolution.159 Fur-
ther, the court noted that evolution is not antithetical to relig-
ion or a belief in God.160 Finally, the court rejected the 




 149. Id. at 716–23. 
 150. Id. at 721; see also id. at 718 (recounting expert testimony from a theo-
logian characterizing Intelligent Design as “not a new scientific argument, 
but . . . rather an old religious argument for the existence of God”). 
 151. Id. at 719. 
 152. See id. at 728–29. 
 153. Id. at 720. 
 154. Id. at 721 (quoting Child Evangelism Fellowship of N.J. Inc. v. Staf-
ford Twp. Sch. Dist., 386 F.3d 514, 531 (3d Cir. 2004)). 
 155. See id. at 718. 
 156. Id. at 734. 
 157. Id. at 763 (holding that the school board’s purpose was to promote re-
ligion, which violated the Establishment Clause); id. at 764 (holding that the 
effect of the school board’s action was to impose a religious view in violation of 
the Establishment Clause). The court did not address the entanglement prong 
of the Lemon test because the plaintiffs had not alleged “excessive entangle-
ment.” See id. at 746 & n.19. 
 158. Id. at 735; see also id. at 735–46 (discussing in detail the issue of 
whether Intelligent Design constitutes a science). 
 159. See id. at 738–43. 
 160. Id. at 765. 
 161. Id. at 762–63. 
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After more than eighty years of public and legal debate 
over the proper content of public school human origin educa-
tion, neither side has tired. As litigants prepare to argue over 
the newest education policies, courts will have to look to the 
lessons and precedents of the past century for the proper rules 
by which to adjudicate the constitutional claims that are sure 
to arise. 
II.  AN ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE ANALYSIS OF 
INTELLIGENT DESIGN EDUCATION 
Under either the Lemon test or the endorsement test, 
teaching Intelligent Design in public school science classes vio-
lates the Establishment Clause. The theory’s historical links to 
creationism and inherently religious character necessarily 
mean that teaching it in public school science classes has an 
impermissible effect and conveys an impermissible message of 
endorsement of religion. Even the most common justifications 
offered for teaching Intelligent Design do not cure this basic 
constitutional violation. 
A. TEACHING INTELLIGENT DESIGN FAILS THE LEMON TEST 
 As discussed in Part I, the federal judiciary has applied the 
Lemon test to analyze human origin education under the Es-
tablishment Clause. Although it is conceivable that an attempt 
to teach Intelligent Design could pass muster under the pur-
pose prong of this test, all such attempts fail the effects prong. 
1. Teaching Intelligent Design May Pass the Purpose Prong of 
the Lemon Test 
Under the purpose prong of the Lemon test, “it is appropri-
ate to ask ‘whether [the] government’s actual purpose is to en-
dorse or disapprove of religion.’”162 Any proffered purpose can-
not be a sham.163 When evaluating Intelligent Design 
generally, no case-specific factual background exists. It there-
fore is uncertain whether a particular case would violate the 
purpose prong. 
Since the Supreme Court stated in Edwards that it “need 
not be blind . . . to [a] legislature’s preeminent religious pur-
 
 162. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 
465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring)). 
 163. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 586–87 (1987). 
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pose,”164 lower courts have been willing to look behind the gov-
ernment’s proffered purpose and investigate the facts and legis-
lative history involved in a particular case to determine actual 
motivation. The court in Selman,165 for example, faced a school 
board decision without an explicit statement of purpose.166 Al-
though that case dealt not with teaching Intelligent Design, but 
rather with using a disclaimer,167 the differences are not mate-
rial to a purpose inquiry under the Lemon test. The Selman 
court found that the school board’s proffered purpose of asking 
students to critically analyze the theory of evolution, although 
not its main purpose, was secular and sincere.168 The dis-
claimer thus passed muster under the purpose prong.169 
Likewise, a school board could add Intelligent Design to its 
curriculum without violating the purpose prong of the Lemon 
test. Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Board of Education, in which 
the court found a religious purpose for a disclaimer,170 can be 
distinguished—just as it was in Selman171—because Intelligent 
Design does not explicitly reference religion. In addition, a hy-
pothetical school board could offer the same purposes that the 
Selman court found secular and genuine: encouraging students 
to critically analyze evolution by considering an alternative 
theory and accommodating the concerns of parents.172 In any 
actual case, a court may be able to derive a religious purpose by 
examining governmental action in light of the “historic and con-
temporaneous link between the teachings of certain religious 
denominations and the teaching of evolution”173 or from cir-
cumstantial or direct evidence presented in the context of the 
particular case. As Selman shows, however, the possibility ex-
ists for a school board to avoid this problem by advancing 
clearly secular purposes. 
 
 
 164. Id. at 590. 
 165. Selman v. Cobb County Sch. Dist., 390 F. Supp. 2d 1286 (N.D. Ga. 
2005). 
 166. See id. at 1301. 
 167. See id. at 1288. 
 168. Id. at 1302–03. 
 169. See id. at 1305. 
 170. Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ., 185 F.3d 337, 344–45 (5th 
Cir. 1999). 
 171. See 390 F. Supp. 2d at 1302. 
 172. Id. at 1305. 
 173. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 590 (1987). 
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2. Teaching Intelligent Design Always Fails the Effects Prong 
of the Lemon Test 
The effects prong of the Lemon test “asks whether the 
[governmental action] at issue in fact conveys a message of en-
dorsement or disapproval of religion to an informed, reasonable 
observer.”174 In evaluating the teaching of Intelligent Design 
under this prong, the factual background of a particular case 
need not be known because the character and historical pedi-
gree of Intelligent Design alone result in impermissible effects. 
a. Intelligent Design’s History Sends an Impermissible 
Message 
Given the “historic and contemporaneous link between [re-
ligion and opposition to evolution]” that the Supreme Court 
found in Edwards,175 “many observers would understand 
[teaching Intelligent Design] as primarily promoting the reli-
gious belief that an intelligent designer created the universe, 
rather than as promoting any reasonable secular interest.”176 
In the words of one scholar, “[T]he [Intelligent Design] move-
ment is infected by the same historic link between religion and 
the opposition to evolution.”177 
The long-standing debate between evolutionists and pro-
ponents of religious theories of human origin is well known.178 
This historical background indicates to the informed, reason-
able observer that scientific advancement is not the lone moti-
vation behind the Intelligent Design movement.179 Recognizing 
that “[Intelligent Design] represents a new line of attack 
against evolutionary biology,” one commentator noted that “it is 
but the latest chapter in a long tradition of creationist 
thought.”180 The Selman court also observed that whether evo-
 
 174. Selman, 390 F. Supp. 2d at 1305. 
 175. 482 U.S. at 590. 
 176. Jay D. Wexler, Darwin, Design, and Disestablishment: Teaching the 
Evolution Controversy in Public Schools, 56 VAND. L. REV. 751, 828 (2003). 
 177. Id. (comparing Intelligent Design to the creationism struck down by 
the Court in Edwards, 482 U.S. at 593). 
 178. See, e.g., Selman, 390 F. Supp. 2d at 1306 (“[C]itizens around the 
country have been aware of the historical debate between evolution and relig-
ion . . . .”). 
 179. Reule, supra note 16, at 2603 (“[T]he historical basis and religious 
context of the Intelligent Design movement indicates [sic] that it encompasses 
more than its ‘scientific’ theories.”). 
 180. Wexler, supra note 4, at 444. 
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lution is a theory or a fact is “a loaded issue with religious un-
dertones.”181 It then found that the disclaimer at issue in the 
case violated the effects prong of the Lemon test because it 
showed that the board had sided with proponents of religious 
theories over proponents of evolution.182 
The Kitzmiller court similarly held that informed, reason-
able observers would be aware of the historical evolution-
creationism debate and would recognize that Intelligent Design 
embodies a religious strategy developed from earlier forms of 
creationism.183 That the term “Intelligent Design” originated 
shortly after “creationism” was condemned by Edwards184 even 
led the Kitzmiller court to describe Intelligent Design as “crea-
tionism re-labeled.”185 This historic link affects observers’ per-
ceptions of teaching Intelligent Design in public schools be-
cause it signifies that the government has “sided with the 
proponents of religious theories of origin,”186 despite any secu-
lar purpose behind teaching Intelligent Design. An informed, 
reasonable observer would conclude that so doing effectively 
endorses religion.187 
Like the Kitzmiller court, the Selman court was willing to 
examine social facts and secondary sources to inform its under-
standing of history.188 Commentators have noted the similarity 
between Intelligent Design and creationism,189 that “Intelligent 
Design’s leaders and proponents are religious right activists,” 
 
 181. Selman, 390 F. Supp. 2d at 1307. Because Intelligent Design chal-
lenges evolution’s basic conclusions, it requires that evolution be considered a 
theory, not a fact. See, e.g., Beckwith, supra note 142, at 462 (“The main thrust 
of . . . Intelligent Design . . . is that intelligent agency, as an aspect of scientific 
theory-making, has more explanatory power . . . than [evolution].”); cf. Sel-
man, 390 F. Supp. 2d at 1308 (stating that classifying evolution as a theory 
and not a fact “has the effect of implicitly bolstering alternative religious theo-
ries of origin”). 
 182. See Selman, 390 F. Supp. 2d at 1307, 1312. 
 183. Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 716–23 (M.D. 
Pa. 2005). 
 184. See id. at 721. 
 185. Id. at 722. 
 186. Selman, 390 F. Supp. 2d at 1307; see also Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d 
at 747 (stating that the historical context of Intelligent Design contributed to 
the conclusion that the school board “consciously chose to change [the dis-
trict]’s biology curriculum to advance religion”). 
 187. See Selman, 390 F. Supp. 2d at 1307 (stating that the school board 
appeared to have “‘take[n] a position on questions of religious belief ’” (quoting 
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 593–94 (1989))). 
 188. See id. at 1308. 
 189. See, e.g., Wexler, supra note 4, at 460. 
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and that “prominent [Intelligent Design] leaders . . . have made 
public statements regarding the religious bias that is driving 
the movement.”190 These sources further show the connection 
between Intelligent Design and religion and support the con-
clusion that a reasonable, objective observer would view the 
teaching of Intelligent Design in public schools as an endorse-
ment of religion. 
It has been argued that this historical link, even if admit-
ted, should not cause an Establishment Clause violation.191 As 
one commentator has suggested, “[I]f an historical connection of 
any sort, no matter how distant or loose, is sufficient to prohibit 
the teaching of a subject, then perhaps astronomy and chemis-
try ought to be prohibited from public school classrooms since 
they have their historical origin in the religiously-orientated 
practices of astrology and alchemy.”192 Ironically, these subjects 
provide perfect examples of practices that successfully shed 
their historical link to religion. The modern practices of astron-
omy and chemistry no longer reflect the religious tenets of as-
trology or alchemy.193 Modern astronomy specifically condemns 
the central tenets of astrology,194 and modern chemistry spe-
cifically rejects the central tenets of alchemy.195 The inferences 
of Intelligent Design, on the other hand, continue to “support, 
 
 190. Reule, supra note 16, at 2603. 
 191. See Beckwith, supra note 142, at 497–98. 
 192. Id. at 498. 
 193. See, e.g., LANSANA KEITA, THE HUMAN PROJECT AND THE TEMPTA-
TIONS OF SCIENCE 37 (1998) (noting that “the natural and biological science 
communities remain relatively unimpressed” with efforts to equate alchemy 
and astrology with chemistry and astronomy, respectively). 
 194. See, e.g., MICHAEL A. COVINGTON, CELESTIAL OBJECTS FOR MODERN 
TELESCOPES 86 (2002) (“Modern astronomers reject astrology . . . .”). Compare 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 76 (11th ed. 2003) (defining 
“astronomy” as “the study of objects and matter outside the earth’s atmos-
phere and of their physical and chemical properties”), with id. (defining “as-
trology” as “the divination of the supposed influences of the stars and planets 
on human affairs and terrestrial events by their positions and aspects”). 
 195. See, e.g., MAURICE P. CROSLAND, HISTORICAL STUDIES IN THE LAN-
GUAGE OF CHEMISTRY xiv (Dover Publ’ns, Inc. 1978) (1962) (“[T]he spirit of al-
chemy is furthest removed from that of modern chemistry.”). Compare MER-
RIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 194, at 29 (defining 
“alchemy” as “a medieval chemical science and speculative philosophy aiming 
to achieve the transmutation of the base metals into gold, the discovery of a 
universal cure for disease, and the discovery of a means of indefinitely pro-
longing life”), with id. at 212 (defining “chemistry” as “a science that deals 
with the composition, structure, and properties of substances and with the 
transformations that they undergo”). 
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and are consistent with, . . . some belief in a higher intelligence 
or deity.”196 In other words, Intelligent Design has not success-
fully shed its historical link to religion because it has not re-
nounced (or at least come to ignore) those tenets which bind the 
theory to particular religious beliefs. The historical debate sur-
rounding theories of human origin is, therefore, still germane 
to an analysis of Intelligent Design because it is common to 
both that theory and the creationism that the Supreme Court 
has previously condemned.197 
b. Refusing to Teach Intelligent Design Does Not 
Impermissibly Endorse Nonreligion 
One could argue that refusal to teach Intelligent Design is 
an endorsement of the evolution side of the evolution-
creationism debate. The reasonable, objective observer would 
ostensibly perceive the refusal to teach Intelligent Design as a 
sign that the government has joined with evolutionists. This, 
the argument would conclude, conveys an impermissible mes-
sage of endorsement of nonreligion.198 
This argument is a misapplication of the debate’s history. 
The nexus of Intelligent Design and the history of the human 
origin debate is the postulation of a designer’s existence, deity 
or not. The previous section argued that if Intelligent Design 
did not postulate the existence of such a being, there would be 
no historical problem. The converse of this assertion is that a 
theory which postulates the nonexistence of such a being 
shares Intelligent Design’s impermissible nexus with the his-
torical debate, although such a theory shows the government 
endorsing the opposite side. 
Refusing to acknowledge a designer’s existence does not, 
however, necessarily result in an assertion of a designer’s non-
existence. Another choice remains: to avoid supporting either 
position. In other words, refusing to teach Intelligent Design 
does not require teaching some other theory which impermissi-
bly asserts the nonexistence of a designer. The choice remains  
 
 
 196. Beckwith, supra note 142, at 517 (emphasis omitted). 
 197. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 592 (1987) (effectively ban-
ning the teaching of creationism for “embod[ying] the religious belief that a 
supernatural creator was responsible for the creation of humankind”). 
 198. Francis Beckwith makes a similar argument, hypothesizing that 
teaching evolution “gives the impression that a certain disputed, irreligious, 
point of view is favored.” Beckwith, supra note 142, at 502. 
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to teach a theory that postulates neither the existence nor non-
existence of a designer. 
Evolution is such a theory. It avoids the nexus with the re-
ligious debate by completely avoiding the subject of a designer 
or creator.199 While Intelligent Design postulates the existence 
of an intelligent designer, evolution does not postulate the lack 
of such an intelligence.200 In fact, proponents of both evolution 
and Intelligent Design have stated that evolution is perfectly 
consistent with a belief in God, a different intelligent creating 
force, or absolute atheism.201 Since evolution thus avoids any 
postulations whatsoever regarding the existence of a creator, a 
policy of teaching evolution but not Intelligent Design conveys 
to the reasonable observer neither a message of endorsement 
nor disapproval of religion. Such a policy therefore presents no 
Establishment Clause problems. 
c. Intelligent Design’s Nature Conveys an Impermissible 
Message 
Even if Intelligent Design did not have the historical prob-
lems discussed above, because of the theory’s nature, teaching 
it in public schools would still violate the effects prong of the 
Lemon test. Intelligent Design’s dependence on the existence of 
a designer renders the theory inherently religious.202 Inde-
pendent of any violations based on history, this characteristic 
conveys an impermissible message of endorsement of religion to 
the reasonable, objective observer whenever Intelligent Design 
is taught in public schools.203 
 
 
 199. See, e.g., JOHN F. HAUGHT, RESPONSES TO 101 QUESTIONS ON GOD 
AND EVOLUTION 61 (2001) (explaining that evolution makes no attempt to “ex-
plain why the universe is ‘set up’ in the first place as such a fertile blending of 
contingent happenings, invariant laws and temporal duration;” that 
“[d]iscerning in depth why the universe is put together this way is the task of 
a theology of evolution;” and that “[t]heology will understand the . . . evolu-
tionary ingredients as grounded in the reality of a promising God”). 
 200. Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 765 (M.D. 
Pa. 2005) (stating that evolution neither “conflicts with, nor does it deny, the 
existence of a divine creator”). 
 201. See David Van Biema, Can You Believe in God and Evolution?, TIME, 
Aug. 15, 2005, at 34, 34–35 (including in a forum on the topic of the evolution-
creationism debate the statements of Francis Collins and Steven Pinker, sup-
porters of evolution, and Michael Behe, a supporter of Intelligent Design). 
 202. See Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 720 (“[Intelligent Design]’s religious 
nature is evident because it involves a supernatural designer.”). 
 203. See id. at 718–21. 
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It is true that governmental action does not violate the Es-
tablishment Clause simply because it “happens to coincide or 
harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions.”204 Some 
thus argue that “[a]s a theory that makes no claims regarding 
the nature, character or purposes of the designing intelligence 
that it detects, [Intelligent Design] cannot logically have a pri-
mary effect of advancing religion” and furthermore that 
“[a]dvancement of religion as a result of [Intelligent Design] 
can at best be a secondary effect.”205 Moreover, federal court 
precedent exists for the proposition that a secondary effect of 
advancing religion is “constitutionally permissible.”206 
This argument is based on the proposition that Intelligent 
Design is not religion. However, no Intelligent Design propo-
nent has ever suggested any “serious alternative to God as the 
designer.”207 In fact, the Kitzmiller court explicitly found that 
the designer postulated by Intelligent Design is the Christian 
God and held that Intelligent Design is religion and not sci-
ence.208 
Whether or not Intelligent Design is religion, the theory 
distinguishes not between “natural causes versus supernatural 
causes, but rather intelligent causes versus undirected 
causes.”209 Intelligent Design “claims only to be able to detect 
intelligent causes, it does not speculate as to the nature of that 
intelligent cause.”210 
But if the existence of such an intelligent cause is admit-
ted, its particular nature only serves to distinguish between re-
ligions. The existence of any intelligent cause that created and 
designed life is a religious view. One scholar has observed that 
“[l]anguage from several Supreme Court decisions strongly 
supports the view . . . that belief in a creator is a religious be-
 
 204. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961). 
 205. Stephen L. Marshall, Note, When May a State Require Teaching Al-
ternatives to the Theory of Evolution? Intelligent Design as a Test Case, 90 KY. 
L.J. 743, 784 (2002). 
 206. Id. (citing McLean v. Ark. Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1272 (E.D. 
Ark. 1982)); see McLean, 529 F. Supp. at 1272 (observing that “[s]econdary ef-
fects which advance religion are not constitutionally fatal” but concluding that 
a state law requiring balanced treatment of creationism and evolution had as 
its “only effect” the “advancement of religion”). 
 207. Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 718–19. 
 208. Id. at 718–19, 745–46. 
 209. Marshall, supra note 205, at 773. 
 210. Id. at 773–74. 
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lief.”211 Of course, the Kitzmiller court’s findings aside, Intelli-
gent Design purposefully avoids using the term “creator.”212 
But the intelligent agent behind the theory “has the ability to 
coordinate the design requirements of multifunctional adapta-
tional packages”213 and to “create”214 life where none existed be-
fore. Establishment Clause analysis looks past this sort of for-
malism.215 This description defines a creator and is broad 
enough to encompass the creator behind the theory that the 
Edwards Court condemned for espousing a religious belief.216 
In the end, therefore, the distinctions between Intelligent De-
sign as science or religion, and the designer of Intelligent De-
sign as natural or supernatural, are merely semantic. They do 
not affect the conclusion, comparatively drawn in Edwards and 
Kitzmiller, that generally acknowledging the existence of an in-
telligent designer or creator impermissibly acknowledges a re-
ligious belief.217 
Generally acknowledging an intelligent designer conveys 
exactly the kind of message of religious endorsement that vio-
lates the effects prong of the Lemon test. The Court has long 
held the Establishment Clause to preclude not only the favor-
ing of one religion over another, but also the general favoring of 
religion over nonreligion.218 Teaching Intelligent Design vio-
 
 211. Wexler, supra note 176, at 818. 
 212. See, e.g., DAVIS & KENYON, supra note 92, at 14 (using “intelligent 
agent”); id. at 71 (using “consummate engineer”); id. at 72 (using “intelligent 
designer”). 
 213. Id. at 72. 
 214. See id. at 14 (referring to “creating a new organism” (emphasis 
added)). 
 215. Wexler, supra note 4, at 460 (citing Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 595 
(1992)); see Lee, 505 U.S. at 595 (rejecting the argument that prayer in the 
context of a public high school graduation ceremony does not violate the Es-
tablishment Clause because attendance is not mandatory on the grounds that 
“say[ing] a teenage student has a real choice not to attend her high school 
graduation is formalistic,” and “[l]aw reaches past formalism”). 
 216. Wexler, supra note 4, at 460 (citing Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 
578, 591–92 (1987)); see Edwards, 482 U.S. at 591–92 (finding fault with a 
state law that forbade the teaching of evolution unless creationism was also 
presented on the grounds that the law “embodie[d] the religious belief that a 
supernatural creator was responsible for the creation of humankind”). 
 217. See Wexler, supra note 4, at 460; see also Kitzmiller v. Dover Area 
Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 720 (M.D. Pa. 2005) (“[Intelligent Design]’s 
[impermissible] religious nature is evident because it involves a supernatural 
designer.”). 
 218. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 696 (1994) (“‘A proper 
respect for both the Free Exercise and the Establishment Clauses compels the 
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lates the effects prong for the same reason that the school 
board policy in Selman violated it: “[b]y denigrating evolution, 
the [government] appears to be endorsing the well-known pre-
vailing alternative theory, creationism or variations thereof.”219 
The book Of Pandas and People,220 which was at issue in 
Kitzmiller,221 provides an apt example. This biology textbook 
presents the theory of Intelligent Design and is an authorita-
tive text on the subject.222 It does not mention any biblical text 
or stories, but does state that “life, like a manufactured object, 
is the result of intelligent shaping of matter.”223 This statement 
is the equivalent of creationism; that the authors of the book 
have substituted words does not change the content of the the-
ory.224 As one commentator remarked, “One need not look far 
beyond the absence of these terms to discover a supreme, su-
pernatural being who designed, coordinated, and created all of 
nature according to a master plan.”225 
d. Evolution’s Nature Does Not Convey an Impermissible 
Message 
Some commentators have criticized evolution on the basis 
that “[i]f a point of view is religious because its plausibility 
lends support to a religion or a religious point of view, then we 
would have to conclude that evolution is as much a religion as 
[Intelligent Design]” because “it lends support to some nonthe-
istic and anti-religious perspectives recognized as religions by 
the Court.”226 This argument mischaracterizes the definition of 
evolutionary theory. As elaborated above, evolution does not 
 
State to pursue a course of “neutrality” toward religion,’ favoring neither one 
religion over others nor religious adherents collectively over nonadherents.” 
(citation omitted) (quoting Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Ny-
quist, 413 U.S. 756, 792–93 (1973))); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 
(1947) (“The ‘establishment of religion’ clause of the First Amendment means 
at least this: [n]either a state nor the Federal Government . . . . can pass laws 
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.”). 
 219. Selman v. Cobb County Sch. Dist., 390 F. Supp. 2d 1286, 1309 (N.D. 
Ga. 2005) (emphasis added). 
 220. DAVIS & KENYON, supra note 92. 
 221. 400 F. Supp. 2d passim. 
 222. See Wexler, supra note 4, at 440–44, 452–54 (describing the book and 
its history and distribution). 
 223. DAVIS & KENYON, supra note 92, at vii. 
 224. Wexler, supra note 4, at 459–60. 
 225. Id. at 460. 
 226. Beckwith, supra note 142, at 489. 
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have the problem of endorsing atheism because it avoids the ex-
istence of a designer or creator altogether. Whereas Intelligent 
Design postulates the existence of an intelligent designer or 
creator, evolution does not postulate the lack of such an intelli-
gence.227 Evolution therefore lends no more support to nonre-
ligion than it does to religion.228 
Because of its historical pedigree and promotion of an in-
herently religious idea, teaching Intelligent Design “conveys a 
message of endorsement . . . of religion to an informed, reason-
able observer.”229 Therefore, independent of any permissible 
secular purpose, and regardless of the specific factual context, 
teaching Intelligent Design in public school science classes al-
ways fails the effects prong of the Lemon test and constitutes 
an Establishment Clause violation. 
B. TEACHING INTELLIGENT DESIGN FAILS THE ENDORSEMENT 
TEST 
Although teaching Intelligent Design violates the Estab-
lishment Clause under the Lemon test, this test has fallen 
slightly from its once ubiquitous status and been criticized by 
some Supreme Court Justices.230 The most likely substitute, 
the endorsement test, was not applied in either Epperson or 
Edwards, but the Court decided these precedents before this 
test was first adopted by a majority of the Court.231  
Many commentators have applied the endorsement test in 
the context of human origin education.232 Additionally, in re-
 
 227. See Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 765 
(M.D. Pa. 2005) (“[Evolution] in no way conflicts with, nor does it deny, the ex-
istence of a divine creator.”). 
 228. Cf. id. 
 229. Selman v. Cobb County Sch. Dist., 390 F. Supp. 2d 1286, 1305 (N.D. 
Ga. 2005) (citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 n.42 (1985); Glassroth v. 
Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1297 (11th Cir. 2003); Bown v. Gwinnett County Sch. 
Dist., 112 F.3d 1464, 1472 (11th Cir. 1997)). 
 230. E.g., Wexler, supra note 4, at 455 & n.152; see also, e.g., Tangipahoa 
Parish Bd. of Educ. v. Freiler, 530 U.S. 1251, 1253 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing) (reiterating his disapproval of the Lemon test), denying cert. to 185 F.3d 
337 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 231. Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 713–14 (noting that the Supreme Court 
and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals have applied the endorsement test to 
many Establishment Clause cases involving religion in public schools, and also 
observing that Epperson, 393 U.S. 97 (1968), and Edwards, 482 U.S. 578 
(1987), predate the Court’s adoption of the endorsement test in County of Alle-
gheny, 492 U.S. 573, 592–94 (1989)). 
 232. See, e.g., Wexler, supra note 176, at 827–28; Reule, supra note 16, at 
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solving a recent challenge to Intelligent Design education, the 
Kitzmiller court stated that “based upon Supreme Court prece-
dent, the endorsement test must be utilized.”233 
Conceptually, the analysis under the endorsement test 
largely overlaps with the effects inquiry of the Lemon test.234 So 
it is not surprising that much of the reasoning under the latter 
applies under the former. The endorsement test evaluates a 
particular practice in light of both the subjective intent of its 
proponents and the objective perceptions of observers to deter-
mine whether it endorses religion.235 The specific question in 
the present context is whether objective student or adult ob-
servers would perceive the teaching of Intelligent Design as 
“‘official school support’ [of religion].”236 This practice violates 
the Establishment Clause if it “sends a message to nonadher-
ents that they are outsiders . . . and an accompanying message 
to adherents that they are insiders.”237 Courts have instructed 
that determining the message so communicated is not a ques-
tion of fact but one of law that is illuminated by “‘judicial inter-
pretation of social facts.’”238 
Without a case-specific factual background, it is impossible 
to evaluate the subjective intent of governmental actors. Never-
theless, both the history and character of Intelligent Design 
show that teaching it in public schools fails the endorsement 
test. 
1. Intelligent Design’s History Violates the Endorsement Test 
Justice O’Connor stated that “the ‘history and ubiquity’ of 
a practice is relevant [under the endorsement test] because it 
provides part of the context in which a reasonable observer 
evaluates whether a challenged governmental practice conveys 
a message of endorsement of religion.”239 Given the inescapable 
 
2603–04; Wexler, supra note 4, at 463–66. 
 233. Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 713. 
 234. E.g., Reule, supra note 16, at 2567. 
 235. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concur-
ring). 
 236. See Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 715 (quoting Verbena United Meth-
odist Church v. Chilton County Bd. of Educ., 765 F. Supp. 704, 711 (M.D. Ala. 
1991) (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 249 (1990))). 
 237. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 238. Selman v. Cobb County Sch. Dist., 390 F. Supp. 2d 1286, 1306 (N.D. 
Ga. 2005) (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 693–94 (O’Connor, J., concurring)). 
 239. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 630 (1989) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
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history of the evolution-creationism debate as discussed above, 
the objective observer would conclude that the teaching of In-
telligent Design has the effect of furthering religious views and 
impermissibly conveying a message of endorsement of religion. 
In evaluating a disclaimer challenging the validity of evo-
lution, the Selman court emphasized the history of the human 
origin debate: it found that an objective observer would per-
ceive the school board as endorsing the views of Christian fun-
damentalists and creationists that evolution is a problematic 
and inadequately supported theory.240 The court observed that 
“[m]embers of certain religious denominations historically have 
opposed the teaching of evolution in public schools.”241 In evalu-
ating a similar disclaimer, the Kitzmiller court held that a rea-
sonable observer, aware of the history of the human origin de-
bate, would presumably know that Intelligent Design is a form 
of creationism.242 The court then held that a reasonable ob-
server would perceive the disclaimer at issue in the case as 
impermissibly inserting a religious concept into public school 
education.243 
The conclusions of the Selman and Kitzmiller courts apply 
with equal force to the introduction of Intelligent Design in 
public school science classes. Any attempt to teach Intelligent 
Design in this context is impermissible because it “mirrors the 
viewpoint of . . . religiously-motivated citizens”244 by introduc-
ing into human origin education the existence of a designer or 
creator. 
As James Madison aptly stated in a criticism directed to-
wards a Virginia tax that required donations to religion, “[this 
governmental action] is itself a signal of persecution” in that 
“[i]t degrades from the equal rank of Citizens all those whose 
opinions in Religion do not bend to those of the Legislative au-
thority.”245 Understood in light of the almost-century-long effort 
to unseat evolution as the primary theory of human origin 
taught in public schools, teaching Intelligent Design would 
 
 240. See Selman, 390 F. Supp. 2d at 1306–07. 
 241. Id. at 1306. 
 242. See Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 721 
(M.D. Pa. 2005). 
 243. Id. at 724. 
 244. Selman, 390 F. Supp. 2d at 1307. 
 245. JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS 
ASSESSMENTS (1785), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 82, 83 
(Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). 
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have the same effect: conveying a message of inclusion to ad-
herents and a message of exclusion to nonadherents.246 Such a 
result violates the endorsement test.247 
2. Intelligent Design’s Nature Violates the Endorsement Test 
Even if Intelligent Design were free of its historical link to 
the human origin debate, teaching the theory in public schools 
still offends the endorsement test because of the theory’s inher-
ently religious nature. The Supreme Court has long held the 
Establishment Clause to preclude not only favoring one religion 
over another, but also favoring religion generally over nonre-
ligion.248 Therefore, teaching Intelligent Design violates the Es-
tablishment Clause because the theory “embodies a generally 
religious viewpoint”249 that advances religion in general. 
As under the Lemon test, whether or not Intelligent Design 
is religion does not matter under the endorsement test. Merely 
acknowledging a general religious belief in a designer or crea-
tor results in endorsement of religion.250 Intelligent Design “is 
concerned with addressing such fundamental questions as the 
origins and meaning of life and our role in the universe.”251 Al-
though the scope of the theory does not encompass the identity 
or nature of the designer, Intelligent Design nonetheless postu-
lates that an intelligent agent designed human life.252 
 
 246. Cf. Selman, 390 F. Supp. 2d at 1306–07 (using the history of this de-
bate to show that a school board had impermissibly sided with creationists). 
 247. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concur-
ring) (using this formulation to define the endorsement test). 
 248. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 696 (1994) (“‘A proper 
respect for both the Free Exercise and the Establishment Clauses compels the 
State to pursue a course of “neutrality” toward religion,’ favoring neither one 
religion over others nor religious adherents collectively over nonadherents.” 
(citation omitted) (quoting Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Ny-
quist, 413 U.S. 756, 792–93 (1973))); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 
(1947) (“The ‘establishment of religion’ clause of the First Amendment means 
at least this: [n]either a state nor the Federal Government . . . . can pass laws 
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.”). 
 249. Wexler, supra note 4, at 458. 
 250. See Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 720–21 
(M.D. Pa. 2005) (describing Intelligent Design as a fundamentally religious 
theory); id. at 713 (“School sponsorship of a religious message is impermissi-
ble . . . .” (quoting Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 309 
(2000))). 
 251. Wexler, supra note 4, at 461. 
 252. See, e.g., DAVIS & KENYON, supra note 92, at 14 (“Intelligent de-
sign . . . locates the origin of new organisms in . . . a blueprint, a plan, a pat-
tern, devised by an intelligent agent.”). 
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This is precisely the same type of practice that the Court 
invalidated in Edwards.253 The Edwards Court found that 
teaching creationism in public schools violated the Establish-
ment Clause because the theory “embodies the religious belief 
that a supernatural creator was responsible for the creation of 
humankind.”254 The human origin theory the Court condemned 
was no more specifically tied to a particular religion than is the 
theory of Intelligent Design. 
Because the content of Intelligent Design includes the gen-
erally religious belief in a designer’s existence—of whatever 
character or nature—objective observers would certainly per-
ceive teaching it in public schools as promoting and supporting 
some religious views.255 This perception “sends a message to 
nonadherents” of those views that they are “outsiders” and an 
“accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders.”256 
It indicates the type of governmental “support [of] one religious 
ideology”257 that the endorsement test was designed to prevent. 
Teaching Intelligent Design, therefore, runs afoul of the en-
dorsement test and violates the Establishment Clause.258 
C. PROPOSED JUSTIFICATIONS FOR TEACHING INTELLIGENT 
DESIGN 
In recent cases and journal articles, litigants and commen-
tators have offered several justifications for teaching Intelligent 
Design (or variations thereof) in public schools. They argue 
that the doctrines of academic freedom and promotion of scien-
tific literacy support the practice.259 Neither of these proposed 
 
 253. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 591–93 (1987). 
 254. Id. at 592. 
 255. See Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 721 (“[Intelligent Design]’s religious 
nature would be . . . evident to [an] objective observer because it directly in-
volves a supernatural designer.”). 
 256. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concur-
ring). 
 257. See Reule, supra note 16, at 2567 (summarizing the test set forth in 
Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687–94). 
 258. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (using the “mes-
sage to adherents” formulation to define the endorsement test); Reule, supra 
note 16, at 2567 (using the “support [of] one religious ideology” formulation to 
define the endorsement test). 
 259. See, e.g., Beckwith, supra note 142, at 507–14 (proposing “Exposing 
Students to New and Important Scholarship” and “Furthering and Protecting 
Academic Freedom” as justifications for teaching Intelligent Design); cf. Sel-
man v. Cobb County Sch. Dist., 390 F. Supp. 2d 1286, 1302 (N.D. Ga. 2005) 
(accepting the advancement of critical thinking as a secular justification for 
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justifications, however, adequately cures the Establishment 
Clause violations discussed in Parts II.A and II.B. 
1. The Doctrine of Academic Freedom 
In 2001, Senator Rick Santorum offered an amendment 
(the so-called Santorum Amendment)260 to the No Child Left 
Behind Act of 2001,261 stating that “where biological evolution 
is taught, the curriculum should help students to understand 
why this subject generates so much continuing controversy, 
and should prepare the students to be informed participants in 
public discussions.”262 Senator Santorum later stated that 
“[t]here is a question here of academic freedom, freedom to 
learn, as well as to teach” and acknowledged that “a number of 
scholars are now raising scientific challenges to [evolution] . . . 
such . . . as intelligent design.”263 The U.S. Department of Edu-
cation has expressed its support of the “principles—reflected in 
the [amendment]—of academic freedom and inquiry into scien-
tific views or theories.”264 
The proposed justification of encouraging academic free-
dom implicates the academic freedom of three groups: school 
districts, teachers, and students. As to school districts, this jus-
tification really amounts to nothing more than an argument 
that the decision to teach Intelligent Design should be left to 
local control.265 It posits that providing instruction as to “why 
 
the use of a sticker disclaiming the factual validity of evolution). 
 260. 147 CONG. REC. S6147–48 (daily ed. June 13, 2001) (statement of Sen. 
Santorum) (reading the proposed amendment). Although the amendment 
passed the Senate, it was not included in the final legislation. Wexler, supra 
note 176, at 835. 
 261. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 
(2002) (codified primarily in scattered sections throughout 20 U.S.C. (Supp. II 
2002)). 
 262. 147 CONG. REC. S6148 (daily ed. June 13, 2001) (statement of Sen. 
Santorum) (reading from the proposed amendment). 
 263. 147 CONG. REC. S13377 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 2001) (statement of Sen. 
Santorum). 
 264. Letter from Gene Hickok, Acting Deputy Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., to 
Linda McCulloch, Superintendent of Pub. Instruction, Mont. Office of Pub. In-
struction (Mar. 8, 2004), http://www.discovery.org/scripts/viewDB/index.php? 
program=News-Archived&command=view&id=1899. 
 265. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 586 & n.6 (1987) (adopting 
the court of appeals’s understanding that “‘[a]cademic freedom embodies the 
principle that individual instructors are at liberty to teach that which they 
deem to be appropriate in the exercise of their professional judgment’” and 
concluding that a state law requiring balanced treatment of creationism and 
evolution was in fact contrary to such a goal (alteration in original) (quoting 
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this subject generates so much continuing controversy”266 is a 
legitimate secular purpose for which individual school districts 
may teach Intelligent Design and that higher authorities 
should not intervene. But this really amounts to no more than 
an argument that teaching Intelligent Design passes the pur-
pose prong of the Lemon test. As already demonstrated, teach-
ing Intelligent Design can certainly pass this prong of the test. 
But the academic freedom justification is not a solution to the 
problem that arises under the effects prong of the Lemon test. 
In other words, a legitimate secular purpose does not cure a 
violation under the effects prong.267 
The Supreme Court in Edwards similarly concluded that 
teachers’ academic freedom was “not a relevant concept”268 
where a state balanced treatment act required teaching crea-
tionism along with evolution.269 That Edwards involved crea-
tionism and not Intelligent Design is not significant under the 
legal argument here. As the analysis above demonstrated, 
teaching Intelligent Design is just as much of an Establishment 
Clause violation as teaching creationism. More importantly, the 
law in Edwards instructed teachers on exactly how they were 
to teach the subject of human origin.270 The Court found that 
the concept of furthering academic freedom was irrelevant in 
such a context because the state board of education, not teach-
ers, controlled the classroom curriculum.271 Consistent with 
this reasoning, academic freedom to teach Intelligent Design is 
an irrelevant concept in any jurisdiction where teachers do not 
control the curriculum. 
In rejecting the proffered purpose of furthering academic 
freedom, the Edwards Court also found that the law at issue in 
the case did not grant teachers any freedom that they did not 
 
Aguillard v. Edwards, 765 F.2d 1251, 1257 (5th Cir. 1985))). 
 266. 147 CONG. REC. S6148 (daily ed. June 13, 2001) (statement of Sen. 
Santorum) (reading from the proposed amendment). 
 267. See, e.g., Selman v. Cobb County Sch. Dist., 390 F. Supp. 2d 1286, 
1305, 1308, 1312 (N.D. Ga. 2005) (finding that although the school board of-
fered an explanation of its conduct that satisfied the purpose prong of the 
Lemon test, the effects prong was independently violated). 
 268. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 586 n.6. 
 269. Id. at 580–81. 
 270. See id. at 581 (“The Creationism Act forbids the teaching of the theory 
of evolution in public schools unless accompanied by instruction in ‘creation 
science.’”). 
 271. Id. at 586 n.6. 
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already have.272 Under prior state law, teachers were not “pro-
hibited . . . from teaching any scientific theory.”273 The analogy 
to a ban on teaching Intelligent Design is clear: because teach-
ing the theory would constitute an Establishment Clause viola-
tion, banning its inclusion in public school science classes 
would not deny teachers any freedom that they do not already 
lack. 
While Meyer v. Nebraska did acknowledge some measure of 
academic freedom for teachers,274 this freedom was the right to 
teach a language other than English.275 This right entails no 
competing constitutional violation. Teaching Intelligent Design, 
on the other hand, implicates all of the constitutional problems 
discussed earlier in this Part. When faced with similar compet-
ing constitutional violations, the Edwards Court specifically 
denounced a claim of academic freedom.276 
Lastly, the teaching of Intelligent Design does not abridge 
the academic freedom of students. The Epperson277 and Ed-
wards278 cases demonstrate that the academic freedom of stu-
dents does not prevent the banning of some topics from being 
taught in public schools. For all the above reasons, Intelligent 
Design is such a topic. Nonetheless, students remain com-
pletely free to explore this theory and evaluate it as they see fit 
outside of the public school context. There is nothing to prevent 
(and actually quite a lot to protect) this activity in homes, 
churches, or community groups when pursued by those who 
wish to learn more about Intelligent Design.279 
2. The Goal of Increasing Scientific Literacy 
Another oft-propounded justification for teaching Intelli-
gent Design is increasing the scientific literacy of students.280 
 
 272. Id. at 587. 
 273. Id. 
 274. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (acknowledging a 
teacher’s right to teach German as a protected liberty under the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
 275. Id. 
 276. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 586 (holding that the law at issue did not fur-
ther academic freedom). 
 277. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968). 
 278. 482 U.S. 578. 
 279. “Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of relig-
ion] . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 280. See, e.g., Beckwith, supra note 142, at 507–09 (proposing “Exposing 
Students to New and Important Scholarship” as a justification for teaching 
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The claim is that, like it or not, Intelligent Design is a theory 
supported by at least a few respected scientists and that hu-
man origin instruction is incomplete without some mention of 
the debate.281 In other words, teachers should “teach the con-
troversy.”282 
Like the argument for academic freedom, this justification 
aptly satisfies the purpose prong of the Lemon test. As one 
commentator concluded, “Intelligent Design’s ‘teaching the con-
troversy’ approach textually advances freedom of thought by 
exposing students to various scientific theories.”283 Some pro-
ponents further urge that “[e]xposing students to larger bodies 
of evidence and alternative theories is necessary not only to 
achieve scientific literacy, but also to the future of science be-
cause it will foster critical thinking and scientific investiga-
tion.”284 This was the purported goal of the Santorum Amend-
ment.285 Senator Santorum stated that a primary purpose of 
the amendment was to “enhance the quality of science educa-
tion for our students.”286 
Although the Selman court found that “[f]ostering critical 
thinking is a clearly secular purpose . . . which . . . is not a 
sham,”287 the Kitzmiller court held that the Intelligent Design 
movement seeks “not to encourage critical thought, but to fo-
ment a revolution which would supplant evolutionary theory 
with [Intelligent Design].”288 Whether or not the scientific liter-
acy justification is sufficient to satisfy the purpose prong of the 
Lemon test, it does not cure any of the constitutional problems 
under the effects prong. As described above, after accepting this 
justification as satisfying the purpose prong of the Lemon 
 
Intelligent Design); cf. Selman v. Cobb County Sch. Dist., 390 F. Supp. 2d 
1286, 1302 (N.D. Ga. 2005) (accepting the advancement of critical thinking as 
a secular justification for the use of a sticker disclaiming the factual validity of 
evolution). 
 281. See, e.g., Beckwith, supra note 142, at 462–65, 507–09. 
 282. Reule, supra note 16, at 2587 (citing DEWOLF ET AL., supra note 140, 
at 23) (stating that proponents of Intelligent Design “encourage local school 
boards, teachers, parents, and attorneys to ‘teach the controversy’”). 
 283. Id. at 2606. 
 284. Marshall, supra note 205, at 770. 
 285. 147 CONG. REC. S6147–48 (daily ed. June 13, 2001) (statement of Sen. 
Santorum) (reading the proposed amendment). 
 286. Id. at S6148. 
 287. Selman v. Cobb County Sch. Dist., 390 F. Supp. 2d 1286, 1302 (N.D. 
Ga. 2005). 
 288. Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 745 (M.D. 
Pa. 2005). 
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test,289 the court in Selman nevertheless invalidated the dis-
claimer at issue because it independently violated the effects 
prong.290 For the reasons discussed in Parts II.A and II.B, the 
same independent violation afflicts Intelligent Design: teaching 
it impermissibly conveys to informed, reasonable observers a 
message that the teaching body has chosen a side in the debate. 
A proffered purpose of increasing scientific literacy cannot, 
therefore, cure the constitutional violation. 
This is not to suggest an abandonment of efforts to further 
scientific literacy. There is surely evidence of the origins and 
development of life that evolution has not been able to fully ex-
plain.291 Schools, therefore, can and should teach students 
about the problems with evolution and how to evaluate them. 
III.  SCHOOLS MAY CONSTITUTIONALLY PRESENT 
SOME PRINCIPLES OF INTELLIGENT DESIGN 
Presenting the idea of an intelligent designer in public 
school science classes violates the Establishment Clause. How-
ever, this does not mean that schools must avoid the topic alto-
gether. Schools may still present secular, scientific criticisms of 
evolution in science classes. They may also describe theories 
such as Intelligent Design outside of science classrooms. 
A. SECULAR CRITICISMS OF EVOLUTION AND ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
OF COMPETING RELIGIOUS THEORIES 
Even though teaching Intelligent Design in public school 
science classrooms is unconstitutional, teaching secular, scien-
tific criticisms of evolution is not. Since much of the material 
upon which the theory of Intelligent Design is based consists of 
secular, scientific observations,292 teachers can present this ma-
terial to illustrate the shortcomings of evolutionary theory. For 
all the reasons already discussed, it is only when public school 
teachers introduce the concept of a creational or designing force 
that they cross the constitutional line. 
 
 289. Selman, 390 F. Supp. 2d at 1302. 
 290. Id. at 1308, 1312. 
 291. See, e.g., Van Biema, supra note 201, at 34 (including in a forum on 
the evolution-creationism debate a statement by Francis Collins, director of 
the National Human Genome Research Institute, who observed that “no one 
could claim yet to have ferreted out every detail of how evolution works”). 
 292. See Reule, supra note 16, at 2587 (explaining that Intelligent Design 
advocates incorporating the views of scientists who “feel that certain evidence 
displays distinctive features of intelligently designed systems”). 
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The concept of irreducible complexity provides a good ex-
ample of such relevant and permissible criticisms of evolution. 
Irreducible complexity is the theory that some organic features 
would not function without every one of their components in-
tact.293 Proponents of Intelligent Design use this idea to point 
out a failing of evolution: it does not address the observation 
that features with irreducible complexity cannot have evolved 
from any simpler feature because any simpler feature would 
not have been able to function, and so would not have evolved 
in the first place.294 Presenting the idea of irreducible complex-
ity to illustrate a potential shortcoming of evolution does not 
implicate constitutional problems because it does not suggest 
any religious or nonreligious view. Irreducible complexity is 
merely a scientific and testable theory that presents a natural 
observation challenging evolution.295 Teachers may not, how-
ever, use the concept of irreducible complexity as evidence of a 
designing agent, as do proponents of Intelligent Design.296 Tak-
ing this conclusory step espouses a religious view and, for all 
the reasons discussed above, violates the Establishment 
Clause. 
As a scientific theory, evolution welcomes criticism. Under 
the analysis above, science teachers are constitutionally free to 
present secular evidence that supports or undermines evolu-
tion. Teachers can also acknowledge both the fact that many 
people may have religious beliefs that are inconsistent with 
evolution and the existence of competing religious theories such 
as Intelligent Design.297 The Establishment Clause is offended 
only when a teacher presents the merits of a theory that es-
pouses religious views (in other words, presents the substance 
of the theory as a viable version of truth).298 The distinction 
 
 293. See Beckwith, supra note 142, at 473–75. 
 294. See id. Evolutionists, however, have provided explanations of how 
these features evolve. See, e.g., Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. 
Supp. 2d 707, 740 (M.D. Pa. 2005). Such a scientific discussion is beyond the 
scope of this Note. 
 295. See Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 738 (“Irreducible complexity is a 
negative argument against evolution, not proof of design . . . .”); id. at 740 (not-
ing that irreducible complexity is a testable and refutable theory). 
 296. See Beckwith, supra note 142, at 475. 
 297. See Davis, supra note 40, at 219 (“[C]reationism can be presented in 
public school settings, provided it is presented objectively and not as 
truth . . . .” (second emphasis added)). 
 298. Cf. id. (“[C]reationism can be presented in public school settings, pro-
vided it is presented objectively and not as truth . . . .” (emphasis omitted and 
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may be subtle, but it is important: acknowledging the existence 
of competing religious theories is permissible;299 including them 
in science curricula and presenting their merits is not.300 In 
other words, the distinction is between describing religious 
views and advancing them. 
B. INTELLIGENT DESIGN IN SOCIAL STUDIES CLASSES 
Another subtlety involves the specific context in which 
public schools present Intelligent Design. Although science 
teachers may not present Intelligent Design on the merits, so-
cial studies teachers may describe the content of this theory 
without raising constitutional concerns. Outside of science 
classrooms, schools may teach Intelligent Design as an illustra-
tion of the current and historical controversy over competing 
theories of human origin, as a part of a survey of religions or 
religious views, or as an example of the development of science 
as a discipline.301 As for education in the controversy itself, 
“any critical thinking advantages that could be gained by 
teaching intelligent design . . . can probably be gained by teach-
ing about religion in social science classes and discussing the 
various relationships between religious and scientific ways of 
thinking in that context.”302 In social studies classrooms, such 
instruction is not a presentation of the merits of Intelligent De-
sign, but rather an unendorsed description of its content.303 
Schools, therefore, retain ample ability to present a full 
human origin education. Public school science classes may pre-
sent the secular, scientific observations upon which Intelligent 
Design relies as valid critiques of evolution. Social studies 
 
emphasis added)). 
 299. See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106 (1968) (citing Abing-
ton Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963)) (“While study of relig-
ions . . . from a literary and historic viewpoint, presented objectively as part of 
a secular program of education, need not collide with the First Amendment’s 
prohibition, the State may not adopt programs or practices in its public schools 
or colleges which ‘aid or oppose’ any religion.”). 
 300. Cf. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 584 (1987) (stating that class-
rooms may not be used “to advance religious views”). 
 301. See Wexler, supra note 176, at 787 (“[H]istory teachers could teach 
about the history of the opposition to evolution . . . ; civics teachers could teach 
about the ongoing controversy over origins . . . ; [and] philosophy teachers 
could teach about the epistemological claims of science and religion . . . .”). 
 302. Id. at 848. 
 303. See id. at 793 (explaining that teachers may describe the content of 
religious theories of human origin so long as they do not express personal 
views regarding them). 
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classes may acknowledge and describe the remaining portion of 
Intelligent Design—namely, the existence of a designing 
agent—so long as they do not present it on its merits. Such a 
solution allows for a comprehensive education while avoiding 
the problem of religious endorsement that leads to an Estab-
lishment Clause violation. 
CONCLUSION 
The debate over public school human origin education is 
now over eighty years old. The recent movement to teach Intel-
ligent Design is only the latest chapter. As with its religious 
predecessors, teaching Intelligent Design in public school sci-
ence classes violates the Establishment Clause under either the 
Lemon test or the endorsement test. The historical pedigree 
that Intelligent Design shares with the creationism that the 
Supreme Court has previously invalidated and the theory’s in-
herently religious characteristic of acknowledging an intelli-
gent designer or creator render this conclusion unavoidable. 
Neither a purpose to advance academic freedom nor a purpose 
to further scientific literacy can overcome this constitutional 
violation. 
This conclusion has both broad and narrow implications. 
Narrowly, it applies only to human origin education in public 
school science classrooms. Broadly, it applies, not only to Intel-
ligent Design, but also to any theory that explicitly postulates 
the existence of a designer, creator, or any other nonnaturalis-
tic superintendent of life’s development. 
None of this is to say that teaching the shortcomings of 
evolutionary theory is unconstitutional. However, as one 
scholar argued, “Establishment Clause concerns arise . . . when 
‘teaching the controversy’ moves from the point of teaching a 
number of theories directly to undermining evolution in order 
to contend that a designer is the only possible explanation.”304 
Evolution is neither a perfect nor complete theory, and schools 
should teach children how to critically evaluate it. In order to 
remain constitutional, however, such instruction must remain 
secular and scientific. 
 
 304. Reule, supra note 16, at 2602. 
